Opinion | The U.S. Response to Bird Flu is Not Reassuring the World

As a virus scientist in South Africa, I’ve been watching with dread as H5N1 bird flu spreads among animals in the United States. The pathogen poses a serious pandemic threat and has been detected in over 500 dairy herds in 15 states — which is probably an undercount. And yet, the U.S. response appears inadequate and slow, with too few genomic sequences of H5N1 cases in farm animals made publicly available for scientific review.

Failure to control H5N1 among American livestock could have global consequences, and this demands urgent attention. The United States has done little to reassure the world that it has the outbreak contained.

The recent infection of a pig at a farm in Oregon is especially concerning as pigs are known to be “mixing bowls” for influenza viruses. Pigs can be infected by both avian and human influenza viruses, creating a risk for the viruses to exchange genetic material and potentially speed up adaptation for human transmission. The H1N1 pandemic in 2009 was created and spread initially by pigs.

Beyond the risks to its own citizens (there are over 45 cases of people in the United States getting the virus in 2024), the United States should remember that the country where a pandemic emerges can be accused of not doing enough to control it. We still hear how China did not do enough to stop the Covid-19 pandemic. None of us would want a new pandemic labeled the “American virus,” as this could be very damaging for the United States’ reputation and economy.

The United States should learn from how the global south responds to infectious diseases. Those of us working in the region have a good track record of responding to epidemics and emerging pandemics, and can help the United States identify new virus strains and offer insights into how to control H5N1. This knowledge has not come easily or without suffering; it has developed from decades of dealing with deadly diseases. We’ve learned one simple lesson: You need to learn your enemy as quickly as possible in order to fight it.

We did this during Covid. In November 2021, my colleagues and I, and others in Botswana, discovered the Omicron variant. We quickly and publicly warned the world that it could rapidly spread. This kind of transparency is not always easy because it can come at large economic cost. For example, after we shared our Omicron discovery, countries around the world imposed travel bans on South Africa ahead of December holidays, spurring backlash. Our team received death threats, and we needed security for our labs. One estimate suggests South Africa lost $63 million in canceled bookings from December to March.

But it was the right thing to do. That’s why it’s so frustrating that genomic sequences of H5N1 animal cases in the United States are not quickly made available. Sharing genomes of virus samples immediately is crucial for understanding the threat and giving the world time to prepare, including developing antivirals and vaccines. Rwanda, for example, was recently bold enough to go public with the detection of the deadly Marburg virus. Health responders there worked around the clock, and within about a month, they seem to have controlled the outbreak. Other countries in Africa have similarly and openly shared data about the spread of Mpox.

I’ve worked for decades with American scientists, and this summer I toured many of the country’s top scientific research institutions and was a speaker at one of its largest annual virology meetings. I know how flabbergasted many American scientists are about the country’s slow response to the H5N1. One highly respected American virologist, David O’Connor, told me that “it seems that the United States is addicted to gambling with H5N1. But if you gamble long enough, the virus may hit a jackpot.” A jackpot for the virus would fuel a global pandemic.

It is time to respond forcefully to this threat. The world’s scientists are here to help, in the same way as the United States has helped us so many times. Countries need to continue to support one another; we need an international scientific and medical force that can work together to respond to new epidemics and potential pandemics, including diagnosing and genetically analyzing every single sample of H5N1.

I understand that it’s not easy to persuade businesses, such as the meat and dairy industries, to allow the testing of all of their animals and staffs, and to make that data public quickly. But I also know that in the end, doing so protects lives, lessens economic damage and creates a safer world.

The world cannot afford to gamble with this virus, letting it spread in animals and hoping it never sparks a serious outbreak — or crossing our fingers that its effects won’t be serious in people. Time will tell. I hope we are not watching the start of a new pandemic unfold, with both the American and the international communities burying our heads in the sand rather than confronting potential danger.

Dr. Tulio de Oliveira is the director of the Centre for Epidemic Response and Innovation at Stellenbosch University in South Africa and associate professor of global health at the University of Washington. He has received numerous awards for his work on virus genomics work.

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