The decision by Mossad chief David Barnea to officially admit responsibility for the "pagers operation" against Hezbollah serves a clear purpose: public relations. It elevates his profile, boosts the morale of the organization, and indirectly serves Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's political and personal interests, as he approved the operation.
A month ago, Netanyahu hinted in an interview with his favorite media outlet, Channel 14, that Israel was behind the operation, which had previously been shrouded in secrecy. By doing so, he engaged in self-promotion, possibly to bolster his own standing. However, this act may inadvertently complicate efforts to secure the release of the hostages in Gaza. The more Netanyahu's self-confidence grows, the less he fears the public pressure that mounts for their release.
With Netanyahu lifting the veil of secrecy, Barnea seized the opportunity to allow the world a glimpse into the Mossad's clandestine activities. Previously, details of the pagers operation were tightly controlled by the military censor over national security concerns. Yet Barnea eagerly facilitated exclusive cooperation with CBS's "60 Minutes." The rationale provided was that such collaboration could enhance Israel's deterrence, conduct psychological warfare against our adversaries, and ensure that the program presented Mossad and Israel in a favorable light, reducing the risk of hostile narratives.
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However, in my opinion, this disclosure lacks operational value or meaningful psychological impact. Hezbollah, Iran and their allies were already well aware of Israel's capabilities. The Assad regime in Syria had already fallen. Unlike the 2018 operation to seize Iran's nuclear archive (ordered by Yossi Cohen, Barnea's predecessor, and sanctioned by Netanyahu), which had strategic significance – proving Iran's deception about its nuclear ambitions and influencing then-President Donald Trump to withdraw from the nuclear deal – this revelation seems more about self-aggrandizement than strategy.
Some former senior Mossad officials, including division heads familiar with the pagers operation, expressed surprise at Barnea's decision. One remarked, "It's bragging for its own sake. It certainly doesn't serve as a deterrent." The move clearly benefits Netanyahu politically, portraying him as victorious in the campaign against Hezbollah and diverting attention from his culpability for the failures of October 7.
David Barnea, right, and Benjamin Netanyahu, last September.Credit: Kobi Gideon/GPO
On that day in September, when Hezbollah operatives' pagers exploded across Lebanon, it was evident to the global community that Israel was behind it. Yet, as is customary, Israeli media were muzzled by censorship and forced to rely on the tired phrase "according to foreign reports." The subsequent exclusive given to CBS highlights the inconsistency of the censorship system, which claims to prioritize national security but often appears to act as a tool for advancing the interests of the security establishment and the prime minister.
To illustrate this point, just a week ago, the censor barred any mention of the pagers operation by Israeli journalists. The fact that Israeli journalists tolerate such provincial behavior is a separate issue worthy of discussion.
"60 Minutes" featured two retired Mossad operatives – they were masked, wearing glasses and their voices were distorted – one of whom was identified as the operation's commander.
On September 17, 2023, thousands of Hezbollah's pagers were destroyed in explosions. The next day, hundreds more walkie-talkies were damaged, some during funerals for those killed while handling the devices. The operation, bold and impressive, caused significant disruption within the ranks of Hezbollah. Thousands were left in shock; 3,000 were injured, and dozens were killed (mostly in Lebanon, some in Syria). It was the largest targeted killing in the history of counterterrorism, executed with minimal collateral damage – earning widespread admiration internationally.
How Israel's Mossad tricked Hezbollah into buying explosive pagers | 60 Minutes
Yet the strategic purpose of publicizing such an operation remains questionable. It appears more an exercise in self-promotion than a calculated effort to advance Israel's security or strategic goals.
The pagers operation represents a remarkable achievement of initiative, planning and creativity, realized over the course of many years. The decision to compromise walkie-talkies dates back nearly a decade, to the tenure of Tamir Pardo as the head of the Mossad. A subsequent decision to target pagers was made a little over four years ago during Cohen's leadership, with preparations continuing under the current Mossad chief, Barnea. However, the operation was not without its challenges. The Mossad leadership at the time expressed doubts and they were hesitant to grant full approval.
The architects of the plan faced significant obstacles in securing support for an operation costing several million dollars – an investment whose implementation and success were uncertain.
Codenamed "Opening Blow," the pagers operation was spearheaded by a select group of particularly creative senior officials and skilled operatives. They worked diligently, with the assistance of the Mossad's legal advisors, to establish and register shell companies. This complex network allowed the Mossad to control the supply chain from a manufacturing company in Taiwan, which was fooled, through front companies in Hungary and other European countries, ultimately reaching Hezbollah. The walkie-talkies and pagers were assembled and equipped with explosives in Israel.
"60 Minutes" disclosed several operational details that would typically be censored without the Mossad's explicit consent. Among these revelations were that the Mossad sold Hezbollah 16,000 devices through its shell companies but refused to supply similar devices to other innocent entities. Additionally, modifications to the pagers' configuration were required to accommodate the explosives, and the operation included extensive tests on dummies to ensure the desired outcome – that the person holding the pager would use both hands to view the encrypted message sent by the Mossad..
American journalist Lesley Stahl interviews a former Mossad agent in the '60 Minutes' episode on the Mossad's pager operation.Credit: Screenshot
Operations of this nature, requiring sophisticated synergy between software and hardware, often involve collaboration with the Israel Defense Forces' Military Intelligence and other special forces, as well as the Israeli defense industry. In this case, one of Israel's largest and most advanced security industries played a critical role in producing the modified pagers. The IDF Operations Directorate, under the leadership of Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva, was also integral to the planning and worked closely with the Mossad throughout the process.
Despite these collaborative efforts, the CBS report emphasized that credit for the operation was solely attributed to the Mossad. This has reportedly contributed to tensions between Barnea and Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, further straining relations within Israel's defense establishment.
Halevi and Shin Bet security service chief Ronen Bar have publicly accepted responsibility for the October 7 intelligence and operational failures, which were among the gravest in the state's history. While they have yet to follow through with concrete actions, their acknowledgment contrasts with Barnea's apparent lack of accountability. Although the Mossad is not directly responsible for intelligence coverage of Gaza, it oversees intelligence operations and targeted assassinations of Hamas operatives worldwide, as well as gathering intelligence on threats from Iraq and Yemen.
Barnea, as head of the Chiefs of Service Committee and a participant in Israel's most sensitive strategic discussions, also bore responsibility for decisions made before the war. This includes the controversial policy of allowing Qatari funds to flow into Hamas-controlled Gaza.
Barnea's role in negotiating the release of hostages has further drawn criticism. Despite traveling to capitals like Doha alongside counterparts from the CIA, Egypt, and Qatar to broker agreements, these deals have repeatedly been undermined upon his return to Israel due to last-minute directives from Netanyahu. Instead of forcefully challenging these inconsistencies, Barnea has acquiesced to the prime minister's personal and political interests.