Three years ago, in February 2022, the European security elite gathered at the annual Munich Security Conference hoping against hope that the Russian troops amassed on Ukraine’s border would not invade. Within days they were scrambling around to find effective responses to Russian aggression. The 2025 conference will be remembered for a different sort of shock, but one which also left them scrambling around for an effective response.
On 14 February, European leaders listened to a lecture from the US vice-president JD Vance about how the internal threats they faced were more serious than those posed by Vladimir Putin, and that they should pay more attention to what the parties on the far right were telling them. Meanwhile, Pete Hegseth, the new US defence secretary, explained that Europe’s security was no longer a priority for the United States, so they would need to build up their own forces – and with some urgency.
This was as they were still stunned from President Donald Trump’s report of his lengthy and productive conversation with Vladimir Putin on 12 February and how negotiations to end the war in Ukraine would start “immediately”. Neither the Ukrainians nor Nato allies had been consulted prior to this decision. While Trump and his aides eventually acknowledged it would be difficult to do a deal on Ukraine’s future without the Ukrainians, a possible European role was discussed only in vague terms, as the Russians made clear their presence would not be welcome. All that was suggested was that European leaders come up with proposals for how they might guarantee Ukraine’s security in the aftermath of whatever deal was agreed.
On the most dire interpretation of the US position, Europeans must now take full responsibility for their own defence, and that of Ukraine, all while being excluded from the vital negotiations that will determine the extent of the challenge they face, especially if this involves an emboldened Russia.
None of this should have come as a surprise. Trump has often said that he wants to repair relations with Russia while complaining that Europe has been freeloading on the US and should no longer expect to be bailed out at times of crisis. But the stark and uncompromising way in which the message was delivered, and at a venue full of influential securocrats in constant conversation, added to the intensity of the moment. Within days, a select group of European leaders were meeting in Paris, hosted by President Emmanuel Macron.
For Europe’s leaders, the timing was less than ideal. Macron, having gambled unwisely on parliamentary elections last summer, is now barely in charge of his government. Olaf Scholz faces an election which is unlikely to see him return as German chancellor. Poland’s Donald Tusk is more secure, but had been hoping to avoid too much drama before he can get his party’s candidate elected in May’s presidential election. Keir Starmer has a stable political position, though he does not always act as if this is the case. With hints that he is prepared to overrule the Treasury in order to get more funds allocated for defence, as well as put British “boots on the ground” in Ukraine, Starmer may enjoy some diplomatic influence (he has a trip to Washington scheduled this month). Increasing the UK’s defence budget to 2.5 per cent of GDP is being mooted, although the pressure is to go even higher. (We can ignore Trump’s demand for 5 per cent from allies, which would involve a doubling of the Budget; US defence spending hovers around 3 per cent.)
Macron argued during Trump’s first term that Europe must seek more “strategic autonomy”, only for events in Ukraine to demonstrate that Europe still needs the US (far more than the US needs Europe). Even if they work hard to wean themselves away from dependence upon the US, it will take years to make a difference – and at an enormous expense. For the UK, with its armed forces and intelligence agencies integrated with the US at all levels, it would be even harder. The Europeans have long tried to find the sweet spot in their military provision that demonstrates to the Americans they take their own security seriously, but not so much that they can manage without the US. Now the challenge is to find the amount that will persuade the Americans not to abandon them completely while providing sufficient forces to cope in case they do.
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These calculations are further complicated by Trump’s enthusiastic embrace of tariffs as a source of revenue and protection for US industry. Trade wars could trigger a severe economic crisis. As with all of Trump’s fixations, there are hopes that more moderate voices in the administration will intervene as the potential economic hit to the US becomes apparent. But if they do not, then it will be even harder to find the extra resources for defence.
The most urgent question is what is going to happen with Ukraine. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio claims his initial meeting with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, in Saudi Arabia was largely about setting up the negotiation process and seeing whether the Russians are “serious”. He, and other US officials, have been seeking to calm anxieties about the lack of engagement with their Ukrainian and European counterparts and promising there will be no sell-out. These anxieties, however, will not go away so long as Trump talks of a grand summit with Putin to seal the deal, when his determination to have a Nobel Peace Prize-winning handshake might encourage him to give the Russian dictator everything he wants.
We can recall that Trump was even more gushing about North Korea’s Kim Jong Un as a negotiating partner during his first term – that is, until reality set in and he realised Kim’s views on how to denuclearise the Korean Peninsula required more concessions than even Trump could offer. Similarly, it should not take long before it becomes apparent that Russia’s starting position is incompatible with Ukraine’s sovereignty, and would require obtaining more territory as well as allowing for only the most feeble of security guarantees. Putin has been consistent in his view that there can be no ceasefire until a final settlement has been agreed; the American approach has been to start with a ceasefire and then talk about the long term. Russia wants to weaken not just Ukraine as much as possible, but Nato too. The last thing Putin wants is Europeans – and especially Ukrainians – poring over the details of any draft agreement pointing out the pitfalls.
The readouts from the Rubio-Lavrov talks in Riyadh on 18 February suggested no breakthroughs, reported no convergence in US and Russian views (only that they understood each other better) and promised no early meeting between Trump and Putin. As expected, there will be working groups to find ways to deal with “irritants” in their bilateral relations, and to explore the possibilities of a deal that is “enduring, sustainable and acceptable to all sides”. That last, vital condition will be welcomed by Kyiv but will also render the negotiations even more challenging. “Enduring and sustainable” requires addressing the huge issues dividing the parties. It is hard to see how these can be resolved in short order. It would not be surprising if the US soon returned to the possibility of an interim ceasefire, an idea always rejected by Putin.
However keen Trump may be on a deal, his team knows that it must be one that Volodymyr Zelensky can sell to his own people. Ukraine’s bargaining position is far from hopeless. After a year of costly offensives, the Russians have not achieved their objectives on the ground. Kyiv, meanwhile, holds a chunk of the Kursk region in southern Russia, is coping with the raids on its electricity grid, and regularly mounts attacks on valuable targets in Russia. If Zelensky demands some sort of visible security guarantee, then Europe will have to provide a good part of it; if Russia demands sanctions relief, then Europe will need to cooperate on that too.
The first and obvious task for the leading European states is to commit to higher defence spending. However, there are already problems with the “reassurance” force that Starmer and Macron have been promoting. To get even a modest force requires a lot of troops, because of the need to have units training and recuperating as well as those deployed. Many countries would need to contribute, and the commitment would, by necessity, be long term. At the recent Paris meeting, neither the Germans nor the Poles, who would be essential participants, showed great enthusiasm. At best, they considered the proposal “premature” as negotiations are only just starting; it is unclear when they will end and what sort of deal will emerge. There are issues over command, air support and supply lines that would need to be addressed. At the very least, it would be difficult for Europe to deploy without US logistics and intelligence support. Starmer’s message after Paris was that unless backed in some way by the US, no security guarantee would be credible. Meanwhile, the only agreed position is that Ukraine’s own front-line forces would need to be beefed up. (Russia demands they disarm.)
As likely as not, there will be no early deal. America has also said that if Russia does not offer concessions, then it is prepared to ramp up the pressure. This has been spoken of largely in economic terms. Hopefully, in these circumstances, the US will continue with its military support to Ukraine, but Europe must expect to pick up a larger share of the burden. This may even involve more direct assistance. So long as fighting continues, a large land force is unlikely to be based in Ukraine, but there is already talk of training missions and of potentially more air and maritime support.
And if there is a deal, then yet another set of issues emerge. Part of the prize for Russia is their rehabilitation. Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, has said the aim is to restore “the entire complex of Russian-American relations”. Trump has spoken of bringing Putin back and reverting the G7 of leading nations into the G8. He can’t do that without the agreement of the other countries, and they are going to be reluctant for some time to treat a country responsible for such aggression (and which has been engaging in sabotage, cyberattacks and misinformation campaigns across Europe) as anything other than a pariah. But will Europe leave all diplomatic dealings with Moscow to Washington? There are urgent issues coming up, such as what is to be done about Iran’s nuclear programme – a set of negotiations in which Russia has been involved.
This moment feels like one of historic significance. Key players are treating it as such. But it is one that, for now, is also made up of conflicting aspirations, anxieties and speculations. No deals are close to being done and many uncertainties still surround the process. The situation is fluid, which provides European nations with opportunities to exercise influence – so long as each country recognises that whatever happens next, they will have to do far more for their own security than they have been inclined to do in the past.
[See also: Will Europe abandon Ukraine?]
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This article appears in the 19 Feb 2025 issue of the New Statesman, Europe Alone