Israel just threw another wrench in the peace process — and possibly doomed the last hostages

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has come up with a new seemingly reasonable but actually impractical demand engineered to prolong the war in Gaza: that Hamas fully disarm before any new ceasefire can be reached. This demand, delivered through Egyptian mediators, is not surprising. Most Israelis, and probably most informed people anywhere, would like to see Hamas both removed from power and stripped of its military capacity.

But it is shocking. Because while a large majority of Israelis support the idea of demilitarizing and eliminating Hamas, a majority also supports ending the war in exchange for a hostage deal — even if that means Hamas survives. And the anguish prompted by the growing belief that Israel’s government has simply ceased to care about the hostages has been reflected in a series of letters and petitions in recent days from various sectors of Israeli society, including pilots and military veterans, intelligence officials, and medical professionals, and others calling for an immediate ceasefire and the prioritization of recovering the remaining hostages.

This new demand is laughable on that front: Every day brings more dangers to the remaining hostages in Gaza, 24 of whom are believed to still be alive. And many days will pass before Hamas will agree to a demand this extreme. Here’s the proof: No Islamist militia in the Middle East has ever voluntarily disarmed. A government well aware of this fact, that also cared about the return of all 59 hostages, living and dead, would not bet their fate on the idea that Hamas will be the first.

The most notable example of a militia in the Middle East laying down its weapons is the Lebanese Forces, a Christian militia that disarmed after Lebanon’s civil war ended in 1990, complying with the Taif Agreement and transitioning into a political party. Hezbollah — the most powerful militia in Lebanon — refused to do the same, and remains armed to this day. If Lebanon has a future as an independent country, and the militias’ insanity be reined in, this is the main disarmament that needs to happen.

Elsewhere, Iraq’s Mahdi Army, led by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, declared a freeze in 2007 and was formally disbanded in 2008 under U.S. pressure. Yet it later resurfaced as Saraya al-Salam, yet another militia, still active and influential.

In the West Bank, factions affiliated with the PLO were partially disarmed as part of the Oslo Accords, with Fatah fighters incorporated into the Palestinian Authority’s security forces.

Notably, the PLO was also forced to leave Lebanon, part of which it had previously dominated, entirely in 1982 after Israel’s invasion. Some had believed, as Israel’s war in Gaza progressed, that Hamas might accept a similar outcome: exile from Gaza, abandonment of arms, and eventual political moderation. For a time, it even seemed Israel might accept such an outcome, seeing it as a way to end the war without full-scale occupation.

But Hamas has shown little interest in this path. Despite the devastation caused by the war it started on Oct. 7, 2023, it mulishly sticks to its guns.

It’s true that some of the region’s most extreme Islamist groups have been mostly destroyed — but only by overwhelming military force. Al-Qaida was decimated after 9/11, and while its affiliates survive in places like Yemen and parts of Africa, the core leadership has been crippled. The Islamic State group, too, was defeated territorially by 2019 and now exists as a scattered insurgency, no longer holding land. But these groups didn’t disarm — they were crushed by Arab and Western forces, at huge cost to the civilians they had trapped in their grip.

Internationally, the picture is only marginally better. A few high-profile militias have disarmed, but almost always under very specific conditions: political inclusion, international mediation, economic incentives and security guarantees. The IRA in Northern Ireland laid down arms after the Good Friday Agreement, backed by a strong political process and international oversight. In Colombia, the FARC mostly disarmed in 2016, though many dissidents later rearmed. Nepal’s Maoist rebels joined the government after their civil war ended, but that too relied on a major structural shift — the end of the monarchy.

These are the exceptions, not the rule.

More often, disarmament is fragile, partial, or rapidly reversed. In South Sudan and Congo, efforts to disarm rival militias have largely failed, with groups either rearming or splintering into new ones. Even in successful cases, the transition takes years and requires sustained support.

And the pattern is clear: Armed groups only disarm when they believe their goals are better served through peace — and when they trust the process. In the Middle East, where ideology, deep mistrust and regional power games dominate, those conditions rarely exist.

In a better world, of course, Hamas would indeed disarm, a result that the Palestinians would fearlessly demand. While some reports suggest that Hamas might be willing to hand over administrative control of Gaza to another authority, its insistence on maintaining its army is a tragedy for the Palestinians and reflects a great problem in the Arab world. And without a credible political settlement, or on the other hand physical obliteration, the precedent for disarmament by such fanatical groups is virtually nonexistent.

So the conflict grinds on. Caught in the middle are ordinary Palestinians, devastated by bombardment and blockade, and Israeli families watching their loved ones waste away in captivity.