The question of the hour in Washington is whether the United States should join Israel’s aerial assault on Iran’s nuclear program. Hawks say American participation would help neuter the threat from a U.S. adversary and bolster deterrence. Doves say the United States risks expending precious munitions and getting bogged down in the Middle East.
Both sides seem to take for granted, however, that U.S. intervention is in Israel’s interest. Hawks in Washington see Israel’s interests as aligned with America’s, and doves see them as misaligned. But few question the assumption that Israel’s strategic aims would be well-served by American participation in the war.
This assumption deserves more scrutiny. Israel’s long-term strategic position depends to a significant degree on the strength of its relationship with the United States, meaning its political popularity among Americans. Direct American participation in the war on Iran would change the U.S.-Israel relationship in a meaningful way at a time when Israel’s political position in both parties is increasingly precarious.
It is a point of pride for Israel, and a great political asset to Israel’s American supporters, that the United States has never sent its own forces to directly participate in Israeli military campaigns. The Jewish state’s great existential wars — 1948, 1967, 1973, and 2023 to now — have all been fought exclusively by Israeli forces, albeit with American equipment and diplomatic backing (and, recently, help with missile defense). Unleashing the U.S. Air Force over the skies of Iran to aid Israel’s bombardment would end that impressive Israeli record spanning three-quarters of a century.
Opinions about the Middle East
None of this should rule out American involvement. But from an Israeli perspective, the tactical and military benefits of such a U.S. operation ought to at least be weighed against the long-term risks to the Jewish state’s status in American politics.
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The benefits from U.S. involvement would probably include a more comprehensive destruction of Iran’s nuclear sites, particularly Fordow, the Islamic republic’s most reinforced enrichment facility. It’s widely believed that the U.S. Air Force — with its B-2 bombers and specialized 30,000-pound bombs that burrow into the earth — can inflict far greater damage on the underground facility than Israel’s air force acting alone.
But that doesn’t mean that Fordow is necessarily beyond Israel’s reach. Israel’s national security adviser, Tzachi Hanegbi, said this week: “The war was planned by [Israel]. We don’t need the U.S. for the goals we defined. We know how to handle all matters,” including Fordow.
For obvious reasons, the Israelis aren’t describing in detail how they would “handle” Fordow, but they presumably have ideas. One often floated — and not ruled out by Israel — is a commando raid on the nuclear facility. Specially trained soldiers on the ground could try to destroy it.
As Iran nuclear expert David Albright explained in an interview with Tablet, Israel has other ways to damage the operations of Fordow: “They could take out the electricity. They could destroy the ventilation system. They can easily destroy the pedestrian entrance. They can destroy the main entrances.” Even without the American bunker-busters, Fordow “could be kept inoperable for quite a while,” Albright said.
Maybe none of this is good enough for Israel. Putting soldiers on the ground might be so risky, and the results from bombing so lackluster, that Israel cannot achieve its war aims without American help.
But Israel ought to be willing to take on some extra risk — even to accept a less-than-perfect military outcome — if that allows it to exit this war without sullying the hard-earned boast that Israelis “defend ourselves by ourselves.”
Israel retains broad and deep American support, especially in the Republican Party, but recent surveys show a significant decline. American participation in the attack on Iran could have unpredictable and negative consequences for the United States, such as forcing Washington to take more responsibility for the postwar situation.
That would give Israel’s American critics more talking points in the years ahead. And if the Pentagon uses weapons against Iran that could have been deployed on other fronts, and the United States later faces a military defeat by, say, China in the Western Pacific, it’s possible to imagine Israel becoming a scapegoat.
From Israel’s perspective, the prospect of a comprehensive defeat of Iran — its regional archrival — might seem so tantalizing that it’s worth leaning harder on American help than it has in the past. But no victories are permanent in the Middle East (or anywhere else), and American backing will be a crucial asset to the Jewish state long after this war. Jerusalem should want to maintain its extraordinary record of military self-sufficiency unless it has no other choice.