The Department of Justice's September 2025 Inspector General report reveals one of the most damaging corruption scandals in recent FBI history—former Special Agent in Charge Charles McGonigal systematically served Russian and Chinese interests while heading counterintelligence operations designed to stop exactly those threats. The case exposes how America's top spy hunter became a double agent, simultaneously betraying his oath to multiple foreign powers for personal enrichment.
While serving as the FBI's Special Agent in Charge of Counterintelligence for the New York Field Office from 2016-2018, McGonigal wasn't just corrupt—he was actively working for the adversaries he was supposed to be catching. His systematic willingness to serve foreign masters while drawing a U.S. government paycheck represents the ultimate betrayal of his counterintelligence mission.
The Double Agent Timeline:
2017: Accepted $225,000 from Albanian contact while actively leaking sensitive CEFC investigation details to protect Chinese interests
2017-2018: Built relationships with sanctioned Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska's representatives while still serving as SAC, positioning himself for post-retirement payments
2018-2020: Worked directly for Deripaska after retirement, earning additional payments from Russian sources
McGonigal wasn't a victim of circumstance—he was a willing triple agent, compartmentalizing his betrayals across Albanian, Chinese, and Russian operations while maintaining his position overseeing America's most sensitive counterintelligence work.
Charles McGonigal transformed his position as America's top counterintelligence official into a personal ATM, systematically obstructing investigations while building relationships with the very foreign adversaries he was supposed to be tracking.
Russian Connection: Oleg Deripaska, the sanctioned Russian oligarch with direct ties to Putin's regime, cultivated McGonigal as a long-term asset, paying him after retirement for services that began while McGonigal still held his FBI position.
Chinese Connection: Ye Jianming's CEFC China Energy Company paid McGonigal's Albanian contact $50,000 monthly while McGonigal leaked sensitive investigation details that allowed key targets to escape U.S. law enforcement.
The Facilitators: Person A ( likely Agron Neza) and Person B (likely Dorian Ducka) served as McGonigal's conduits to foreign intelligence operations, with Ducka's family connections to Albanian leadership providing additional diplomatic cover for the schemes.
McGonigal's actions constitute espionage—he systematically transmitted classified information to foreign adversaries while sabotaging U.S. counterintelligence operations. In June 2017, he leaked to his Albanian contact that the FBI was targeting CEFC, information that immediately reached Chinese intelligence through the corporate network.